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Abstract
The paper investigates the formation of information sharing communities. The environment
is characterized by the anonymity of the contributors and users, as on the Web. Furthermore
information exchange is limited to simple recommendations. When preferences differ, it is argued
that a community may be worth forming because it facilitates the interpretation and understanding
of the posted information. The admission rule within a community, the quality of information, and
the stability of multiple communities are examined.
Keywords value of information, communities, anonymity, preference diversity
JEL classification C71, D83, D85
1PSE, 48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France. e-mail: demange@pse.ens.fr.
1
1 Introduction
Group structures on the Web such as peer-to-peer (P2P) systems aim at sharing various goods and
disseminating information in a fully decentralized way. Quite often, information is not rivalrous
and returns to scale are not decreasing. Why then do communities form with a free but restricted
access? This paper argues that a basic rationale is related to the value of information. A tremendous
quantity of information is posted on the Web, on blogs for instance. In some situations however,
all this information is useless. As an illustration, consider a page in which an individual provides
her opinion on movies. If she says that it is worth watching movie A, or that she prefers movie A
to movie B, do I benefit from this knowledge? If the peer is a critic, and I am pretty aware of her
tastes, her judgment may be valuable to me. If instead I have no idea at all about her preferences,
I learn nothing. In other words, how useful a person’s statement is much depends on whether
the preferences of this person are known. As a result, when contributors are anonymous, posted
information on topics on which tastes differ may have little value. Furthermore, in these situations,
search engines may not be helpful either. Given a query, an engine provides a ranking based on the
observed behaviors of those who have experimented the topic. The ranking is valuable to other users
only if they share similar tastes and know it. This suggests that a community, by filtering the peers
who contribute to a platform, may facilitate the understanding and the usefulness of the conveyed
information. This paper investigates in a stylized model the criteria on which this filtering may be
determined and whether information is efficiently processed.
There are individuals who regularly look for a piece of advice on a category of ’objects’, on
movies for instance, and who occasionally post information on a particular object, when they have
seen a movie for instance. Objects differ in some characteristics and individuals differ in their tastes.
More specifically, objects’ characteristics and individuals’ preferences are characterized by a single
parameter on a circle as in Salop differentiation model (1979). Two crucial features bear on the
information process. First, anonymity is preserved as often in P2P. Second, although we assume
truthful behavior, language is limited. Individuals are able to describe whether they have enjoyed
consuming a particular object but they are unable to describe why, in particular they are unable to
describe the object’s characteristic.
To analyze the value of the posted recommendations, we follow Blackwell (1953). Recommen-
dations are valuable to a peer if they allow him to make ”better” decisions, that is decisions that
increase his utility. Anonymity and limited language prevent this to be generally true. Recommen-
dations are useful to users who share similar tastes, and furthermore, posted information without
control on the contributors may not only be useless but also detrimental by introducing some noise
in the information relevant to other peers. Thus the admission rule in a community is essential in
determining the value that each peer derives from the information provided by the community’s
members. This leads us to analyze preferences over admission rules. Community’s members do
not fully agree on an admission criterion owing to their differences in tastes, even if all of them
benefit from the community. We analyze this divergence and, assuming that a leader/initiator of a
community chooses the admission rule, we study how this choice is influenced by the contribution
rate,2 the cost and the probability of finding an answer to a query, and the sharing of ad revenues.
2There is some evidence of ”free-riding” in P2P systems. A main question is whether the generated difficulties
are severe enough to call for the implementation of incentive schemes (see Feldman et al. 2004 and Ng et al. 2008
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Whereas the circle model is the simplest model to explore our ideas, the analysis can be extended
to different or more complex settings under heterogeneity in preferences. In particular, the value
for a community is explored more informally under vertical differentiation when individuals agree
on ranking the objects according to an ’objective’ quality but may differ in their willingness to pay.
Also, in our basic model, a peer who is contemplating buying a particular object searches for a
single recommendation at most. A question is whether the availability of an important number of
recommendations, or of an appropriate statistic on those, reveals all the information an individual
needs to make a good decision and thereby destroys the value of forming a community. The answer
depends on whether preferences really differ. In the circle model, even when a large number of
recommendations is available, forming a community that restricts access so as to be homogeneous
enough is still valuable, and information is not precise enough for peers to make good decision. This
is contrasted with a vertical differentiation model. Hence, due to limited language, when tastes
really differ, information exchanges are valuable only between similar individuals.
Finally, we study the coexistence of several communities, called a configuration. To predict which
communities might form and be durable, stability concepts borrowed from cooperative game theory
are useful. The threat of proposals to form a new community puts constraints on configurations.
An interesting question is whether communities form so as to reach some form of efficiency. Indeed
there is a trade-off between the amount of information received by peers and its relevance to them:
as a community becomes less strict in its admission rule, peers are more numerous but more diverse,
which makes recommendations more numerous but less informative. This trade-off is optimally
solved at an efficient configuration. It is shown that stability does not imply efficiency nor does
efficiency imply stability because of external effects. For instance, it may happen that at an efficient
configuration each peer would like his own community to expand and to accept newcomers, which
makes the configuration unstable. However expanding communities leads to the suppression of some
of them, which has an overall negative effect on welfare because of the decrease in the relevant
information.
This paper is related to the growing literature on the search for relevant information on the
Internet. The ranking provided by a search engine can be seen as an aggregator of preferences
that determines ’objectively’ the relative importance of Web pages. As such, it is more valuable
under common preferences. This explains why search engine rankings share some similar features
as the methods used for measuring ’quality’. Indeed, as acknowledged by Page et al. (1998), the
PageRank method used initially by Google has been inspired by the citation analysis techniques (see
Slutzki and Volijn 2006 who provide axiomatizations of some methods). Also, Dwork et al. (2001)
explicitly assume a common underlying ranking and borrow tools from social choice theory in order
to study aggregation over several engines. In a circle model as considered here, any anonymous
aggregation of preferences over the whole population yields a completely flat ranking, that is the
society is indifferent between any two objects, and distinct rankings provided by search engines can
only be attributed to chance or to bias. In some sense, a community forms with members whose
preferences are homogeneous enough to allow for a useful aggregation.
The formation of communities and preferences diversity are recognized as an important feature
of the Web environment. Various algorithms have been proposed for detecting communities through
for example). Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) and Corbo et al. (2007) provide theoretical analysis of free-riding in a
network context.
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link structure, as surveyed in Newman (2001). Recent empirical studies analyze the growth of
communities as a function of an underlying social network (Backstrom et al. 2006 for instance).
This paper investigates, in a specific context, why and how a community forms in the first place
(without any prior network). This is also the concern of Asvanund et al. (2004) who investigate how
communities may improve the efficiency of search in the Web environment.3 They consider a hybrid
P2P architecture (close to Gnutella 0.6.) in which an ’ultrapeer’ forms a club by choosing to link
with ordinary peers and these ultrapeers are connected between themselves. Forming a club with
peers who are interested in the same topics (recognized by a ’catalog’) improves their chances to
find answers to their queries. Hence communities are based on the similarity of interests, while here
they are based on the similarity of preferences and the adverse selection difficulties due to limited
language. The diversity of preferences is also at the root of ’collaborative filtering’. Collaborative
filtering is a system that aims at giving tailored recommendations to a user on the basis of his
past behaviors and a collection of ’similar’ user profiles (Hofmann and Puzicha 1999). Typically, an
e-commerce retailer recommends to a user to buy a particular item because another user who has
behaved similarly in the past has bought that item. Hence, instead of a recommendation sent by a
peer who has experienced an object, the purchase is itself interpreted as a good signal even though
the buyer might have disliked it. More importantly, the system is centralized in contrast with P2P.
Our model accounts for both the decentralization and anonymity aspects. An individual voluntarily
chooses a community and all peers within a community have access to the same recommendations,
allowing for anonymity and privacy.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on belief formation or social learning, in which agents
choose actions over time based on information received by others, either by direct communication
or by observing actions. Information bears on an unknown state of nature, and its transmission
is constrained by a specific setting. For instance information is conveyed by neighbors in a given
network structure or the agents whose actions are observed move in a given sequence. A main
question analyzed by this literature is whether beliefs converge and whether they converge towards
the ’true’ state of nature (see Goyal 2005 for a survey). In our model, a ’state of nature’ is the
objects’ characteristics. Because language is limited to simple subjective statements, and by the
very fact that communities must be homogeneous enough to be valuable (in a circle model), objects’
characteristics are not revealed, even with access to numerous peers’ recommendations. Finally,
DeMarzo et al. (2003) consider another form of limitation in communication in which information
is processed through an exogenous ’listening structure’ (or network) with individuals who fail to
disentangle what is truly new in the signals they receive over time. The main question investigated
here is instead to determine which listening structures might emerge in a setting in which the
recommendations given by some individuals are detrimental to others.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 sets up the model and Section 3 studies a single
community. Section 4 analyzes configurations of communities. Individuals behavior is investigated
when multiple and possibly overlapping proposals to form a community are made, and coordination
failure is discussed. How proposals are made is explored and the stability and efficiency properties
of configurations are investigated. Proofs are gathered in the final section.
3I thank a referee for pointing out to me this paper.
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2 The model
Consider one category of ’objects’, such as movies, or books, or restaurants. Individuals differ in
their tastes. Differentiation models in which preferences and objects are characterized by a single
characteristic are a stylized and parsimonious way to model these differences. I adopt here the ’circle’
model introduced by Salop (1979). Specifically, an object, a movie or a restaurant for instance, is
characterized by a point on the circle. Each individual has a most-preferred object specification
and his preferences decrease in the distance to this object along the circle. The perfect symmetry is
the advantage of this model over Hotelling (1929) model in which characteristics lie in an interval:
all characteristics are a priori equally preferred (under the assumptions of uniform distributions
that we shall take). We thus avoid technical difficulties due to ’corners’. Also, this means that a
characteristic does not specify an intrinsic quality, as in a vertical differentiation model (Shaked and
Sutton 1983). Section 3.3 examines how results extend to both Hotelling or vertical differentiation
models.
An object’s characteristic is specified by a ’point’ on the circle t. Individual’s preferences are
characterized by the most-preferred object specification θ on the circle. An object ’located’ at t is
called a t-object and similarly an individual ’located’ at θ is called a θ-individual. A θ-individual
who buys a t-object derives a utility gain u(d(θ, t)) that is non-increasing in the distance to the
object d(θ, t) on the circle between θ and t. If this gain is negative, the individual is better off not
buying the object. Function u is non-increasing, identical for all individuals. To fix the idea, at
most half of the objects are valuable to an individual: There is a threshold value d∗, 0 < d∗ < pi/2
for which u(d) > 0 for d < d∗ and u(d) < 0 for d > d∗. Furthermore function u is continuous and
differentiable except possibly at d∗. As a simple example, consider the situation in which individuals
either do or do not enjoy consuming the object, as is represented by the following binary function:
for some positive g and b, u(d) = g, d < d∗, u(d) = −b, d > d∗. (1)
(The utility level at d∗ does not matter because the probability of an object being distant of d∗ to
a person is null.)
The society is uniformly distributed on the circle. Individuals who benefit from buying a partic-
ular object is given by those located at a distance smaller than d∗. Thus, under perfect information
on an object’s location, a proportion d∗/pi of the people buy it, independently of the location t. But
there is imperfect information on new objects. This is the situation we are interested in. New objects
are assumed to be a priori uniformly distributed on the circle. There is some scope for information
sharing: Individuals who have bought an object may post their opinion on it. Our aim is to study
the value of a community in gathering and sharing such opinions.
The analysis is conducted in a Von Neumann-Morgenstern setup. Under imperfect information
on objects’ characteristics, an individual forms some assessment on the location and decides whether
to buy a particular object by comparing the expected utility gain from buying it with 0. A weak
form of risk aversion is assumed: faced with the lottery of buying two objects with equal probability,
a peer prefers not to buy if the sum of the distance is larger than 2d∗, i.e. u(d1) + u(d2) < 0 for
d1 + d2 > 2d∗. The assumption is satisfied under risk neutrality, u(d) = d∗ − d or under concavity
of u since 12 [u(d1) + u(d2)] ≤ u( (d1+d2)2 ) ≤ u(d∗) = 0. For a binary function (1), risk aversion holds
for b > g. Risk aversion implies that the expected utility gain derived from buying at ’random’ is
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negative. We say that u exhibits strict risk aversion if the inequality u(d1) + u(d2) < 0 holds not
only for d1 + d2 > 2d∗ but also for d1 + d2 = 2d∗, d1 6= d2 (this is satisfied for a strictly concave u).
2.1 Communities
In a community, the role of contributors and users can a priori be distinguished. Contributors add
to the content by providing information on the objects they have tested while users have access to
the posted information. Here the sets of contributors and users are identical. This is induced by
the following assumptions. First we assume that there is no intrinsic motive to contribute such as
altruism. Thus, for a community to be ’viable’ as defined in the next section, contributors are also
users so as to draw some benefit. Second, even though there may be no direct cost (nor benefit)
in allowing users not to contribute, it may be worth restricting access to contributors simply to
encourage them to contribute. In that case users and contributors coincide.
Anonymity and restricted access can be implemented by mechanisms that propagate queries
through a P2P network (examples are Gnutella and Freenet, with various architectures, ranging
from centralized to fully decentralized systems). A query is sent to neighbors who provide an answer
if they have one or otherwise pass the query to their own neighbors and so on until an answer is
reached.4 The system can be anonymous by recognizing members by an address only. Records,
which are not public, can keep track of peers’ behavior. Sanctions such as exclusion are based on
these records and automatic. Records on peers’ contributions for instance allow the community to
sustain some contribution level by excluding users who contribute too little.
In our model, a proposal to form a community is represented by an arc. It will be assumed that
the system can detect whether the recommendations given by the members are indeed compatible
with the characteristics in the selected arc. By convention, an arc [θ, θ′] designates the arc from θ to
θ′ going clockwise. The center of community [θ, θ′] is (θ+ θ′)/2 and its size is defined by (θ′ − θ)/2.
We start by considering a single arc and identify a community with the set of all individuals
whose characteristics belong to that arc. (Section 4 introduces the distinction between a proposal
to form a community -an arc- and the set of individuals who effectively join.) One of our tasks is to
determine what is the value of joining a community. This will depend on the whole membership, as
made precise in next section.5
The technology is characterized by two data: a probability of ’success’, which is the probability of
finding a recommendation for a particular object in reasonable time and an individual participation
cost. In line with decentralized behavior, the size of a community determines the probability of
success, which is denoted by P (α) for a community of size α. P is assumed to be increasing and
concave. For example, it can be described by a Poisson process P (α) = 1− e−λα for some positive
parameter λ which reflects the contribution rate of the community members and the efficiency of
the search mechanism. The participation cost includes the cost for searching and contributing.
Normalizing by the average number of requests, it is denoted by c. When it is small, as is likely, it
does not play an essential role in the analysis. The probability P and the cost c are first assumed to
be given. However contributions have a public good aspect, and a minimal amount of contributions
4See for example Kleinberg and Raghavan (2005), and Arcaute et al. (2007) for a description of decentralized
mechanisms and an analysis of the incentive to pass the information.
5This is to be contrasted with network formation models such as Jackson and Rogers (2004) in which relationships
are formed through bilateral links and under myopic behavior.
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can be asked for to increase the success probability P . Section 3.2 investigates this point more
closely.
2.2 Signals
Consider a particular object, recognized by a name, say a title for a book or for a movie. Opinions
on that object are described by signals. Stating a detailed judgment is difficult. To account for
this, signals are assumed to be limited. A signal s on an object takes two values, yes or no, which
are interpreted as a recommendation to buy or not to buy. Since there is no benefit from sending
a false signal, signals are assumed to be truthful: a θ-individual having bought a t-object sends yes
if u(d(θ, t)) ≥ 0 and no if the inequality is reversed.6 As will be clear later on, the limitation in
communication is not due to the use of a binary signal. What matters is that a signal pertains to
feelings (or utility levels) rather than to objective objects’ characteristics.
Let us consider a signal on a particular object from a member of community [θ, θ′]. It can be
seen as a ’random’ recommendation s˜ since the sender is considered as drawn at random from the
community. In the sequel s˜ ∈ [θ, θ′] refers to a signal sent by a member of community [θ, θ′].
The value of a signal can be analyzed from the viewpoint of Blackwell (1953). Signal s˜ is valuable
to an individual if it enables him to make ‘better’ decisions in the sense that his expected payoff is
increased. More precisely, the signal is used as follows. The joint distribution of (t˜, s˜) for a signal s˜
sent by a member of community [θ, θ′] can be computed. After learning the realized value of a signal,
peers revise their prior on the characteristic t according to Bayes’ formula and decide to buy or not.
Clearly a signal that does not change the prior on the object’s location is useless. The ignorance of
the sender’s location in the community has the following consequences.
• (i) A signal s˜ from the whole society is useless.
• (ii) A signal from a community smaller than the whole society may be useful because it changes
the prior.
• (iii) Two simultaneous signals may convey less information than each one separately.
Point (i) is straightforward. A signal sent by an individual chosen at random in the whole group
does not modify the prior, hence is not informative.
Point (ii) is also clear. Figure 1 illustrates the case of a community [−α, α] and d∗ = pi/2. Each
peer sends no for an object located in [α + pi/2,−α − pi/2]. Thus the posterior density conditional
on the signal being yes is null on that arc: the posterior clearly differs from the prior density.7
To show Point (iii), consider a signal from a community reduced to a point, say 0, so that the
sender’s preferences are known. The signal is informative as follows from point (ii) or, more directly,
6Malicious individuals can be incorporated. Under some expectation on their distribution, their presence introduces
additional noise in the information inferred by a signal. The same argument applies if individuals make error in their
judgment.
7More generally, consider the probability of a positive signal from community [−α, α] for a t-object gα(t) = P (yes ∈
[−α, α]|t). Each member in the community sends a positive signal yes for t ∈ [α − d∗,−α + d∗], which we call the
acquiescence zone, (gα(t) = 1) and each one sends no on [α+ d∗,−α− d∗], which we call the refusal zone gα(t) = 0.
Outside these two zones there is disagreement and the probability is linear in between. By Bayes’rule, the posterior
density conditional on a yes ∈ [−α, α] is equal to gα(t)/(2d∗).
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because a yes indicates that the object is in [−d∗, d∗] and a no in the complement [d∗,−d∗]. Add a
signal sent from [pi]. The important point is that, on the receipt of the two signals, it is not known
which peer has sent which signal. The two signals, which are always opposite to each other, give no
information because the prior is not changed. In this simple example, the new signal not only adds
no information but also destroys the information conveyed by the first signal. The reason is that
adding a signal introduces an additional source of randomness due to the anonymity of the sender.
In contrast, in the standard framework, adding a signal is never harmful because it can simply be
ignored.
 -α α
α+Π/2
  
−α−Π/2
no
Figure 1: d∗ = pi/2
An informative signal has some value to a person if its receipt affects this person’s optimal
decision. Here, there are three options: to follow the recommendations (that is to buy the object
on the receipt of a positive signal and not to buy it on the receipt of a negative signal), or not to
listen to them (which gives null utility level), or to take the opposite action of the recommendations.
Let us assume for the moment that a person indeed follows the recommendations (this assumption
is justified in next proposition). We analyze how the benefit depends on the individual’s position
in the community and on the size of the community. Specifically, given a community of size α, let
U(θ, α) denote the expected utility of an individual whose distance to the center is θ conditional on
having an answer to a query and on following the recommendation. The a priori probability for a
positive signal is equal to p = d∗/pi since, given an object at random, each individual says yes with
probability p. Up to a rotation, the arc may be assumed to be centered at zero. Using that there is
no purchase on the receipt of a negative signal gives
U(θ, α) =
d∗
pi
E[u(d(θ, t˜))|yes ∈ [−α, α])]. (2)
The following proposition states how this value U varies with θ and α.
Proposition 1 Let U(θ, α) be the expected value from following a recommendation of a community
with size α for an individual whose distance is θ from the center and V (α) = U(α, α) the value for
a peer located at an extreme point.
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• (i) Given α, α ≤ d∗, utility U(θ, α) decreases in the distance θ to the center for θ ≤ d∗.
• (ii) Given θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ d∗, utility U(θ, α) decreases in α, 0 ≤ α ≤ d∗.
• (iii) There is a value αmax smaller than d∗ such that V (α) is positive for α ≤ αmax and
negative otherwise.
• (iv) Given α ≤ d∗ ≤ pi/4 no individual benefits from taking the opposite recommendation of
the community.
The properties hold for all individuals located at a distance smaller than d∗ from the center, hence for
some outsiders to the community. Point (i) is natural given the symmetry. It says that the expected
benefits derived from following a signal decrease with the distance to the center. According to point
(ii), the expected value per signal is greater the smaller the community, that is the less uncertain
the sender. This is easy to understand for a peer located at the center (θ = 0). As the size α
increases, the objects that he dislikes (distant by more than d∗) are more likely to be recommended
and those he likes get less recommended. For an individual who is not at the center, the distribution
of signals is ‘biased’ with respect to his own preferences and as α increases some objects that he
likes get more recommended. Increasing α is however still harmful because the distribution of the
distance to a peer of the recommended objects becomes riskier in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance as shown in the proof. An implication of property (ii) is the superiority of an expert
’everything else being equal’. More precisely, assuming the expert’s position perfectly known, her
recommendations are more valuable than those of the communities’ members. Hence a system in
which an expert sends as many signals as the community at the same total cost makes every peer
better off. Point (iii) will be important to bound the scope of a community. The point follows
from weak risk aversion, which implies that two persons whose distance is larger than 2d∗ cannot
both benefit from following the same recommendations. Finally point (iv) justifies our assumption
that either following or ignoring a signal is the optimal strategy provided the tastes are restrictive
enough.
Let us give two examples, the computation of which are given in the appendix. For a binary
function (1), we have U(θ, α) = d
∗
pi [g − (g+b)4d∗ (α + θ2/α)] and αmax = 2gd
∗
(g+b) decreases from d
∗ to 0
when b/g ranges from 1 to ∞.
For a quadratic function u(d) = d∗2 − d2, U(θ, α) = d∗pi [d
∗2
3 − 23α2 − θ2].
2.3 Viable community
Anybody is free not to join a community. A basic requirement is that all community members
benefit from it, a property that we call viability. A community is said to be viable if each of its
members benefits from it, accounting for the failure of search and the participation cost. Since,
in the absence of information, an individual does not buy, reservation values are null. Hence, an
individual distant of θ from the center of a community of size α is indeed willing to participate if
P (α)U(θ, α) − c ≥ 0. To cover the cost, the utility from following a signal, U , must be positive.
From point (i) of Proposition 1, the peers who achieve the lowest benefit are located at the extreme
points of the community. The viability condition can be written simply as
P (α)V (α) ≥ c where V (α) = U(α, α). (3)
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From (iii) of Proposition 1, viable communities are of size smaller than d∗, and under a small
enough cost, the set of viable sizes is non-empty. Property (ii) points out a trade-off faced by
peers: increasing the size increases the probability of getting an answer but decreases the value of
an answer. To analyze this trade-off, we make the following assumptions A0 and A1 throughout
the paper, without repeating them. The size α is restricted to be smaller than αmax so that utility
levels are all positive.
Assumption A0 (concavity assumption) The functions logU(θ, α) and logV (α) are concave with
respect to α in ]0, αmax[ for each θ < αmax.
Assumption A1 (elasticity with respect to the extreme)
−U ′α
U
(0, α) ≤ −V
′
V
(α) for α in ]0, αmax[ where − V ′(α) = −[U ′α + U ′θ](α, α)
Under A0, PV is log-concave as a product of log-concave functions. Hence the set of viable sizes
is an interval [α, α] which is non-empty for a low enough cost c, (for c = 0, α=0 and α = αmax),
which we shall assume. Under A1, the relative loss for the center is smaller than the relative decrease
in the utility of an individual located at an extreme. The following assumptions B are mostly used
for interpretation and mentioned when needed.
Assumptions B (elasticity with respect to position)
B− :
−U ′α
U
(θ, α) decreases with θ or B+ :
−U ′α
U
(θ, α) increases with θ
Under the elasticity assumptions, either B− or B+, the relative loss incurred by a peer due to
an increase in the size is monotone in the position, either decreasing or increasing. Both cases are
possible as explained below (I have not found general conditions on u under which either assumption
holds). Note that V ′(α) includes not only the variation due to the size but also the one due to
the position, which is negative because U decreases with the distance to the center from (i) of
Proposition 1. Hence B+ implies A1 and B− is compatible with A1. For example, assumptions
A0,A1, and B− hold for a binary function, and A0,A1, and B+ hold for a quadratic function.
The purpose of next sections is to analyze which communities might form. Before proceeding,
it is worthwhile to understand the differences with standard differentiation models. Initiated by
Hotelling, they have been used in political science as in Downs model (1957) to analyze political
competition of candidates with respect to the ideal positions of the electorate, or in industrial
organization, in order to study imperfect competition (pricing, choice of the products). This analysis
is closer to the political paradigm because monetary transfers nor firms are allowed.8 Furthermore,
I shall consider ’leaders’ who initiate a community and may share some resemblance with political
leaders. There are however important differences from political competition. I do not impose a
priori constraints on the number of leaders/communities, and the aim of a community is not to win
an election but to share information.
8A firm has a well defined objective, to maximize its profit. With transferable utilities, the objective of a community
would be to maximize the sum of the utilities. See section 4.3, which analyzes welfare in more detail in a multiple
communities setting.
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3 A single community
This section analyzes the formation of a single community, when individuals who may join a com-
munity face no other alternative than not joining (multiple opportunities are considered in next
section). Of course a requirement is that all community members benefit from it, namely that the
community is viable. There are many different viable communities, provided the search cost c is not
too large. Furthermore, in a setting without firms nor transferable utilities, there is not a unique
criterion to determine which community will form. As a result, community’s members may have
conflicting views about its scope, i.e., about the membership rule. We analyze this conflict and pay
special attention to the choice of a ’leader’.
3.1 Peers’ preferences
In practice, a ‘leader’ initiates a community and possibly defines criteria for accepting peers. The
leader in our model does not play an important role -in particular a leader does not influence other
peers- but allows us to fix the center of the community. Let αθ denote the value that maximizes the
payoff P (α)U(θ, α), that is the preferred size of a peer who is at a distance θ from the center. The
leader’s optimal community size is given by the value α0 provided it is viable.
Proposition 2
1. Let αenl be the unique solution to the equation α = infθ≤ααθ. If αenl < α a viable community
is Pareto optimal if and only if its size is larger than αenl: otherwise, slightly enlarging it while
keeping the same center makes every peer and every newcomer better off. If αenl ≥ α, only a
community of size α is Pareto optimal.
2. The leader’s optimal choice is either (a) the leader’s optimum α0 if it is viable and in this case
the community is closed to outsiders, or (b) the maximal viable size α.
3. Under B+ peers’ optimal choices are decreasing the distance to the center. Under B− peers’
optimal choices are increasing so that αenl = α0.
Point 1 gives bounds on the size of Pareto optimal communities. The first case occurs for c small
enough (α is decreasing in c whereas αenl does not depend on c). The proof is easy. Note first that
the equation α = infθ≤ααθ defines a unique value αenl: the right hand side is decreasing from α0
to 0 as α ranges from 0 to αmax. This implies that for α < αenl we have α < infθ≤ααθ. Hence,
if αenl < α, for a size smaller than αenl, a slight enlargement with the same center makes every
insider better off (because α < αθ for each θ ≥ α) and the new members, who do not belong to
any community, are willing to join (because α < α). When αenl ≥ α, such an enlargement would
make outsiders worse off. A reduction in a viable community leaves some peers alone, lowering their
utility level to zero, hence cannot lead to a Pareto improvement for the community’s members. (Of
course, there is no reason why such reduction would not be contemplated by some peers if this is
profitable to them. This point is examined in next section together with the formation of multiple
communities.)
According to point 2 , when the leader’s optimum is not viable, in case (b), it is because it is too
large: the individual at the extreme just breaks even. In case (a), we have P (α0)V (α0) > c (except
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in the boundary case where the equality holds and α0 is equal to α ); thus, close enough outsiders
would achieve a positive payoff by joining (by continuity of the payoffs), but they are not allowed to
do so. This is why the community is closed.
Point 3 makes precise the direction of possible disagreements within the community when an
elasticity assumption B holds. The argument is the following one. At the preferred peer’s choice, the
relative loss due to an increase in size exactly compensates the relative increase in the probability
of success. Under B+, the relative loss is larger for any other peer further away from the center,
who thus prefers a smaller size. This implies that when the leader is unconstrained as in case (a),
peers all prefer a smaller size than the leader’s choice (and a larger one under B− by reversing the
inequalities). In case (b) instead, under B−, all peers, including the leader, would benefit from an
increase in the community size up to α0. However, since peers at the extreme of the community just
cover their cost, no outsider wants to join.
Illustration To illustrate Proposition 2, we consider a Poisson process P (α) = 1 − e−λα and a
binary function, and discuss the impact of the probability of success and ad revenues on the leader’s
choice.
Let us consider an exogenous increase in the probability of success (other things being equal),
here an increase in the parameter λ, as results from an improvement in the technology or from
an increase in the number of members due to an increase in Internet users. Figure 2 depicts the
maximal viable size α (the increasing line) and the leader’s optimum α0 (the decreasing line) as a
function of λ. Since the leader’s choice is the minimum of these two values, increasing the population
has different effects on the leader’s choice depending on whether this choice is constrained or not.
The following configurations are obtained as λ increases. First, for λ low enough, there is no viable
community, second the leader’s choice is constrained equal to the maximal viable size, and third the
leader can choose his optimum value. This can be explained as follows. Increasing the population
within a community makes it more attractive to outsiders. When the community is constrained by
viability, for intermediate values of λ, these outsiders are welcome. As a result, the size is increased
(note that this argument uses A1 only, not B). Instead, when the community is closed, for a large
enough λ, increasing the population allows the leader to choose a community restricted to peers
whose tastes are more and more similar to his own: the size decreases. The impact of λ on the
size directly translates into an impact on the precision of information: as λ increases, information
is first made less precise (but the higher chance of getting some information compensates the loss)
and then more and more precise.
We discuss now the impact of ad revenues on the leader’s choice. To simplify, suppose that peers
do not mind ads and that ads do not influence their preferences on the object on which they are
searching information. We consider two alternative ways of distributing the revenues generated by
ads, which are assumed to be proportional to the number of peers.
First, let the leader capture all ad revenues. In this case the leader’s objective is to set up a
community that maximizes a combination of his own interests and the revenues. The optimal choice
is unchanged if the viability constraint binds. Otherwise, instead of choosing his most preferred size,
α0, the leader chooses a larger size (between α0 and α). The more the leader cares about revenues,
the closer his choice to the maximal viable size, and, as a result, the less precise the transmitted
information is. The effect can be substantial for large λ because the maximal viable size α is large
and α0 is small. Whereas a community could be tailored to his specific tastes, the leader chooses
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looser access criteria so as to capture more ad revenues.
Second, let ad revenues be distributed equally among peers. The effect amounts to diminish
cost c, which results in an increase in the maximal viable size and leaves the optimal leader’s size
unchanged. Hence, the leader’s choice is closer and more often identical to his most preferred size.
In Figure 2, the maximal viable size is drawn for two distinct values of the cost (the upper increasing
line represents α0 for the lower value of the cost).
3.2 Enticing Contribution
Various factors influence the probability of successful search. Some result from a policy imposed to
the community’s members such as the enforcement of a minimal contribution rate. We assume here
that P is influenced by the peers’ contribution rates. A minimum rate is asked for, implemented
through records on peers’ contributions. The leader now chooses both the size and the minimal
contribution rate.
We assume that the peer’s participation cost c is an increasing function of his contributions. As
a result, no peer will contribute more than the minimum required rate: the supported cost would
increase with a null benefit since the impact of a single individual on the success probability is
negligible. This is a standard effect in public good provision. Given the minimum required rate
λ, let P (λ, α) and c(λ) denote respectively the probability of success when each peer contributes λ
and the incurred individual cost. P is non-decreasing and concave in λ and c is non-decreasing and
convex.
Without constraint on viability, the leader’s optimum is the value of (λ, α) that maximizes
P (λ, α)U(0, α)− c(λ). The maximal viable size now depends on λ; it is denoted by α(λ).
Proposition 3 The leader’s choice is either (a) the leader’s optimum if the size is viable; the
community is closed to outsiders and peers who are not at the center would prefer a lower contribution
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rate, or (b) a smaller contribution rate than the optimum and a size equal to the associated maximal
viable size α(λ); the choice of λ trades off the benefits from increasing contribution and the loss due
to a smaller community size (i.e., α(λ) decreases at the chosen value of λ).
Given the chosen contribution rate, the choice of the size is dictated by the same considerations
as in the previous section, which leads to the two cases (a) and (b). As for the contribution rate,
note that the marginal benefit from increasing the contribution rate, Pλ(α, λ)U(θ, α) − c′(λ), is
decreasing in the distance θ to the center (as U is). When the leader is not constrained as in case
(a), the marginal benefit from increasing the contribution rate is null for the center, and all peers
with different characteristics would prefer to decrease the contribution rate (and they would all
prefer to increase the size if assumption B− holds or to decrease it B+ holds). When the leader is
constrained as in case (b), the leader’s marginal benefit from increasing the contribution rate must
be non-negative because otherwise a small reduction in the rate would lead to a Pareto improvement
within the community. Hence the leader would benefit from an increase in the contribution rate
and from an increase in size. Increasing the rate however incites some peers at the extreme to leave
thereby decreasing the size, which results in a trade-off.
3.3 Alternative differentiation models
The previous analysis builds on the trade-off between the amount of information (increasing in the
scope of the community) and its relevance (decreasing in the scope). Such a trade-off naturally
arises in alternative models, under horizontal or vertical differentiation. In both cases, preferences
and objects differ through a single characteristic. Uniform distributions are assumed. My aim here
is only to explain why there is still a value for a restricted community, without analyzing precisely
its choice.
Hotelling differentiation model. Characteristics (both for objects and individuals) are on an
interval instead of a circle. Individuals still value the objects according to their distance to their
own location. Most properties extend. In particular, the expected value of a signal to a peer is
decreasing in the size of the community, and communities must be of limited size (smaller than d∗)
to be viable. Furthermore, when a leader is at a distance larger than 2d∗ from both boundaries,
Proposition 2 exactly applies (because in that case there is no ’corner’ effect: the distributions of
the recommended objects for any community that might form -the size of which is smaller than d∗
by viability- are identical in the circle and line models).
Vertical differentiation model. Objects differ in quality. Individuals all agree on the ranking
of quality levels but differ in their willingness to pay. Individuals’ preferences are represented by
a utility of the form u(t − θ) in which t is the quality level of the object and θ is the reservation
value, that is the minimum quality that makes the object valuable to the individual (normalizing
u(0) = 0). Individuals’ tastes do not widely differ here so that peers may have less incentives to
limit the access to a community than in the circle model.
Let us first investigate viability. Viability takes a slightly different form than in the circle
model because optimal behavior in the absence of any recommendation may differ across individuals.
Specifically, let B(θ) denote the expected utility per object bought at random for a θ-individual.
B(θ) is decreasing so that individuals with a low enough θ may benefit from buying whereas those
with a high enough θ will not. The reservation utility of a θ-peer is therefore the maximum of 0 and
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B(θ).
Now let U(θ, [θ1, θ2]) denote the expected utility per recommendation for a θ-individual who
follows the recommendations given by the peers of community [θ1, θ2]. When no answer to a query
is obtained, a peer adopts the strategy that is optimal without information. Hence the overall
utility for a θ-peer joining community [θ1, θ2] is P (β)U(θ, [θ1, θ2]) + (1 − P (β))max(B(θ), 0) − c
where β = (θ2 − θ1)/2 denotes the community’s size. The viability conditions require this value to
be larger than the reservation value max(B(θ), 0) for each θ in [θ1, θ2]. Using that B(θ) increases
with θ, these conditions simplify into
P (β)U(θ, [θ1, θ2])− c ≥ 0 for θ = θ2
P (β)[U(θ, [θ1, θ2])−B(θ)]− c ≥ 0 for θ = θ1.
The first condition requires that the more exigent peers, those with θ2 as reservation value, are at
least as well off by searching for a recommendation on an object rather than never buying. If it
holds true, it is also satisfied for θ smaller than θ2. It is violated when the community accepts
’easy’ individuals who inflict a loss to a θ2-peer by inciting too much to buy, which occurs for θ1 low
enough. The second condition says that a peer with the smallest reservation value, θ1, is at least as
well off by searching for a recommendation on an object rather than buying it systematically. If it
holds true, it is also satisfied for θ larger than θ1 (by a simple argument). It is violated when the
community accepts individuals who are much more strict than a θ1-peer, (θ2 large enough), making
him lose many opportunities. To sum up, viability requires preferences not to be too diverse.
Consider now the issue of choosing the scope of a community. Write a community as [m−β,m+β].
The value per signal can be shown to be decreasing in the ’scope’, that is U(θ, [m−β,m+β] decreases9
with β whatever θ in [m−β,m+β]. Hence, as in the circle model, increasing the scope and making
the senders’ preferences more diverse is harmful to any peer everything else being equal. Taking
into account the probability of finding the recommendation as a function of the size β, this defines
the trade-off between receiving more useful information but less often. Hence, as in horizontal
differentiation models, there is a value for a community, possibly closed: peers may want to restrict
the access to the community. However, a main difference arises when signals are numerous, as we
now investigate.
3.4 Multiple signals
So far, we have assumed that a peer searching for a recommendation stops at the first one she
finds. We examine here the situation in which a peer possibly obtains several recommendations, as
generated by the following behavior. A peer searches a given lapse of time and considers all the
recommendations that she obtains during that lapse. The receipt of n˜ signals is described by a vector
of 0 and 1, but the only relevant information is summarized in the number of positive signals, s˜n˜.
An alternative interpretation is that the community provides a statistic on the number of positive
and negative recommendations. If all recommendations are recorded, this is the best statistic that
9Up to a normalization, take the objects’ characteristics to be distributed on [0, 1]. Utility per signal U(θ, [m −
β,m + β] is equal to 1
β
Rm+β
m−β u(t − θ)(t − (m − β))dt +
R 1
m+β(u(t − θ)dt. A marginal increase in the scope dβ
leads to a marginal variation in utility equal to dβ
β2
Rm+β
m−β u(t − θ)[m − t]dt. Since u is increasing, the inequality
[u(t− θ)−u(m− θ)][m− t] ≤ 0 holds for each t. We thus have Rm+βm−β u(t− θ)[m− t]dt ≤ u(m− θ) Rm+βm−β [m− t]dt = 0.
Thus marginal utility with respect to β is negative for each θ.
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can be provided in our setting. Consider a community C of size α (for the moment we do not need
to specify the differentiation model). The expected utility is defined as
Uˆ(θ, C) =
∑
n≥1
P (α, n)U(θ, C, n) (4)
where P (α, n) denotes the probability of receiving n signals from a community of size α and U(θ, α, n)
denotes the expected utility derived by a θ-peer upon the receipt of n signals from C under optimal
behavior.
Observe that optimal behavior is not as simple as in the case of a single signal. In particular
different peers may react differently on the receipt of the same signals. Given a number of signals,
the optimal strategy for a peer is characterized by a threshold value such that a peer buys the object
if the number of positive recommendations exceeds the threshold. The threshold depends on the
number of signals and risk aversion. Considering the limit of the situation in which more and more
recommendations are available turns out to be instructive and simple. In particular it allows us to
answer the natural question of whether a large number of recommendations enables peers to make
the right decision. Specifically, do they achieve the maximal payoff, namely the utility level reached
under perfect information, when they buy all objects valuable to them and only those ? In the circle
model for instance, the maximal payoff is given by 12d∗
∫ d∗
−d∗ u(t)dt for each θ.
To investigate this question, note that, given a t-object, each received signal is distributed ac-
cording to the probability of a positive signal from the community conditional on t. Let P (yes ∈
C|t) = gC(t) denote this probability. By the law of large numbers, the proportion of positive sig-
nals, s˜n/n, converges to gC(t) when n tends to ∞. Applying this property to the circle and vertical
differentiation models gives a clear distinction between the two models, as stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 Let U(θ, C,∞) (resp. U(θ, C, n)) be the utility derived by a θ-peer who is told the
probability of a positive signal from community C conditional on t, P (yes ∈ C|t) = gC(t) (resp. the
realization of n signals), and behaves optimally.
1. The sequence U(θ, C, n) is non-decreasing with n and converges (from below) to U(θ, C,∞)
when n tends to ∞.
2. U(θ, C,∞) is strictly less than the maximal payoff for θ not in C.
3. In a circle model, whatever n, a community C is valuable to all its members only if it is of
limited size, less than d∗. U(0, C,∞) is equal to the maximal payoff. For positive θ, under
strict risk aversion, U(θ, C,∞) is strictly less than the maximal payoff.
In a vertical differentiation model, U(θ, C,∞) is equal to the maximal payoff for each θ in C.
The monotony and convergence results stated in point 1 follow from the fact that the statistics
s˜n are getting more informative in the sense of Blackwell as n increases and converge to gC(t).
These results yield conditions for the convergence of the overall expected utility Uˆ(θ, C) as given
in (4). Using that U(θ, C, n) is non-negative (used for n smaller than n0) and non-decreasing gives
U(θ, C,∞) ≥ Uˆ(θ, C) ≥ P (α, n ≥ n0)U(θ, C, n0) where P (α, n ≥ n0) denotes the probability of
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receiving at least n0 signals from a community C of size α. Hence we obtain the following inequalities
for each n0:
0 ≤ U(θ, C,∞)− Uˆ(θ, C) ≤ [U(θ, C,∞)− U(θ, C, n0)] + P (α, n < n0)U(θ, C, n0)
Thus, since on the right hand side the term inside the bracket tends to zero as n0 increases, the
overall utility converges to U(θ, C,∞) if the chances of getting few signals, P (α, n < n0), tend to
zero.
To assess the value U(θ, C,∞) and to understand the distinction between the differentiation
models as stated in point 3, we need to consider optimal behavior upon the receipt of the probability
gC(t). Observe first that in both differentiation models, the probability of receiving a positive signal
from community C is equal to 1 in the acquiescence zone (every peer says yes) is null for the objects
in the refusal zone (every peer says no), and is linear in between. Hence a peer in the community
who is told that gC(t) is 1 (resp. 0) knows for sure that the object is valuable (resp. not valuable)
to him. Observe that this is not true for an individual outside the community. Under vertical
differentiation for instance, consider C = [θ1, θ2] and someone who is more exigent than C peers,
namely whose θ is larger than θ2. Knowing that the object is valuable to all members of C (gC(t)
is equal to 1) simply indicates that the quality exceeds the upper bound θ2, which is not enough for
the θ-individual to make the good decision for sure: this explains point 2.
For a value of gC(t) strictly between 0 and 1, which indicates that the object is in the disagreement
zone, we need to distinguish between the circle and vertical models.
Consider first the circle model. The value gC(t) reveals the distance to the center |t|, hence the
location t or −t each with equal probability. As shown in the proof, optimal behavior is characterized
by a threshold value (which depends on θ) defined as the positive solution tˆ to the equation u(|θ +
t|) + u(|θ− t|) = 0: it is optimal for a θ-peer to buy the object if the value |t| exceeds the threshold
tˆ and not to buy in the opposite case. For peers who are not located at the center, the threshold
value is strictly smaller than d∗ (under strict risk aversion). As a result, they lose some valuable
purchase opportunities and are strictly worse off than under complete information. Hence, since the
value U(θ, C,∞) provides an upper bound to U(θ, C, n), peers -except those at the center- do not
reach the maximal payoff even with an access to a large number of recommendations.
Consider now a vertical differentiation model. The probability for an object to be recommended
reveals exactly its quality (the value gC(t) is one to one in the disagreement zone). Hence peers can
make the right decision in all circumstances, namely buying the objects of quality larger than their
reservation value θ and only those: peers get enough information (at the limit) to reach the maximal
payoff. The basic reason for this result is that individuals’ rankings are the same. Even though
recommendations differ, their aggregation sends a clear message, namely a single cutoff quality, in
contrast to a circle model.
This analysis points to important differences between differentiation models in the rationale for
forming communities. Under vertical differentiation, in opposite to the circle model, there is no a
priori upper bound on the size for a community to be viable. Furthermore, upon the receipt of a large
number of signals, all peers within a community obtain almost all the information they need, and
not those outside. This suggests that the largest community, without any restriction on membership,
should emerge: more recommendations are provided, useful to all. This argument however should
be checked more precisely: by arguing directly on the limit probability gC(t), we are neglecting the
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randomness in the (finite) statistic, the variance of which depends on the size of the community: the
larger the size the larger the variance.
4 Configurations of communities
We have so far considered a single community. This section analyzes the coexistence of several
communities. Individuals are free to join whatever community is open to them, or not to join any.
We shall assume that each individual is willing to join one communiy at most. We first discuss
equilibrium behaviors given a set of proposed communities, and next address the question of which
proposals are made.
4.1 Equilibrium and coordination issues
Given a set of proposed communities, individuals’ choices are based on how much value they expect
to derive from a community. We look for an equilibrium under which these expectations are correct.
Expectations on others’ decisions play an important role and may result in multiple equilibria, some
of which entailing some form of coordination failure.
A proposal to form a community is represented by an arc. In the following discussion, it is
important to distinguish between the potential members, that is the individuals whose characteristics
belong to the arc, and the individuals who decide to join and will form the community. When all
potential members join, the community is said to be full. The probability P (α) should be interpreted
as the success probability only for a full community of size α. If nobody joins the proposal for
example, then the probability of success drops to zero. Hence, the viability condition, which is
computed under the success probability P , implicitly assumes full communities.
Consider a proposed arc that intersects no other one, for example a single arc as in the previous
section. Assume the arc to be viable. Since potential members face no other proposal, joining
is ’rational’ for them if they expect all others to join. Thus there is an equilibrium in which the
full community forms. But, if nobody joins the proposal, then the probability of success drops
to zero, making it rational not to join. Thus there is also an equilibrium in which no community
forms. Coordination fails since everybody is worse off than at the equilibrium in which they all join.
Such coordination failure does not occur under the following expectations. When a proposed arc is
the only choice to its potential members, they compute the value of joining the community under
maximal participation, that is by assessing the success probability by P .
When proposed arcs overlap, some individuals (in non-negligible number) have the choice between
several proposals. The requirement that an individual picks up a preferred community among those
open to him does not pin down a well defined behavior. The reason is that the individual’s choice is
based on the comparison between the utility levels expected from each proposal, and that such levels
depend, in turn, on the expected community memberships (in their characteristics and numbers)
through the derived distributions of the signals and their impact on the success probability. Hence
individuals’ decisions and expectations on those interact. As a result, several configurations may be
perfectly compatible with rational behavior. The following example illustrates this point.
Let two proposals be overlapping and of identical size, [−α, β] and [−β, α] where α > β > 0, as
in Figure 4.1 (arcs are ’stretched’). Let the sizes α + β and α be viable but not α − β. There is
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Figure 4: Coordination failure
an equilibrium in which the full community [−α, β] forms and is the only one to form: under these
expectations, all individuals who have the choice between the two proposals are better off by joining
proposal [−α, β] (this is rational by viability), and the remaining individuals, whose characteristics
are in [β, α], can only choose proposal [−β, α] and do not join because this can only result in a
community included in [β, α], which is not viable. Similarly, there is an equilibrium in which the full
community [−β, α] forms. In addition one may consider an equilibrium in which the peers who have
the choice between the two proposals split themselves according to a ’cutoff’ point. Here, taking
0 as the cutoff point (by symmetry), the configuration with the two communities [−α, 0] and [0, α]
form an equilibrium: expecting that each one forms, peers in [−β, β] prefer the community with
the closest center (because communities are of equal size) hence peers in (−β, 0) prefer community
[−α, 0] to [0, α] and the reverse holds for peers in (0, β).
Rational behavior does not prevent coordination failure, as occurs when individuals split them-
selves in the ’wrong way’. Still in the same example, let individuals who have the choice between
the two proposals, those in [−β, β], split at the cutoff point 0 but make the opposite choice to the
one just considered. This results in two communities, each one composed with the individuals whose
characteristics belong to disjoint arcs: community C1 with individuals’ characteristics in the two
arcs [−α,−β] and [0, β], and C2 with the two arcs [−β, 0] and [β, α]. For some parameters α and
β, the two communities C1 and C2 form an equilibrium.10 This occurs when individuals in (−β, 0)
prefer C2 to C1 and those in (0, β) prefer C1 to C2: expecting individuals’ choices to lead to the
formation of C1 and C2 makes it a rational choice. For example, taking a binary function, this
occurs for β = 2α/3 (see computation in the appendix). There is some form of coordination fail-
ure, because everybody is better off at the equilibrium with the two communities [−α, 0] and [0, α],
where they split at 0 but make the opposite choice. The argument does not depend on symmetry
and is more generally valid. Whenever an equilibrium results in two communities each one with
two disjoint arcs, everybody would be better off if there was an exchange of peers of equal measure
between the two communities: this exchange would keep the probability of success constant for
both communities but would improve the quality of transmitted information. From now on, I focus
on configurations without coordination failure, in which each community is full, composed with all
individuals whose characteristics belong to a single arc. Such a configuration is described by a set of
10The expected utility derived from joining C1 assuming it forms is
P (α/2)[
(α− β)
α
U(θ, [−α,−β]) + β
α
U(θ, [0, β])]− c
because the chances of obtaining the signal from each interval are proportional to their size.
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non-overlapping arcs. I focus on symmetric configurations (see however the end of section 4.2). A
symmetric configuration is given by n non-overlapping communities of equal size α, with n at most
equal to pi/α. For n strictly smaller than pi/α there are gaps between any two consecutive arcs (we
do not necessarily require the gaps to be of equal size). For n equal to pi/α, the union of the arcs
fill the entire circle and the configuration is said to be without gaps. In what follows, we address
two questions. Which configurations may last? Which configurations are optimal (in a sense to be
made precise)?
4.2 Stability
A configuration may last if it is stable against proposals to form new communities or to rearrange
the existing ones. Specifically, stability requires that no proposal to change is accepted. A proposal
is said to be accepted if all members in the new community are better off than under the standing
configuration. This notion is basically the blocking condition of cooperative game theory. This
allows us to model a kind of competition between communities in a setting in which there is no
unambiguous objective for a community: new proposals must make every peer better off in order to
take care of the diversity of preferences.
Given a configuration, consider a proposal to form a new community. As discussed previously,
expectations matter for evaluating a proposal. We shall assume that peers evaluate a proposal under
the expectation that everybody joins. Denote by u¯(θ) the utility level achieved by a θ-individual at
the standing configuration, where θ is any point on the circle. For a symmetric configuration, u¯(θ)
is given by
u¯(θ) = 0 if the individual does not belong to any community,
u¯(θ) = P (α)U(d, α)− c if he does and d is the distance to the center.
Write the proposal as [m−β,m+β] where m is its center and β is its size. Proposal [m−β,m+β]
is said to block a standing configuration with utility levels u¯(θ) if
P (β)U(|θ −m|, β)− c > u¯(θ) for each θ in ]m− β,m+ β[. (5)
The left hand side gives the utility evaluated by a θ-individual in the proposal who expects that
everybody joins the proposal. Condition (5) requires that such expectations are fulfilling since they
make it rational for everybody to join.
I consider here proposals to form a new community that contain a community’s leader, who can
be assumed to be located at zero. Let us distinguish stability with respect to proposals that are
larger in size than the existing community from those that are smaller. A symmetric configuration
with communities’ size α is stable against enlargement (resp. stable against reduction) if there is no
proposal [m − β,m + β] which includes zero and with size β larger (resp. smaller) than α that is
accepted. Observe that although the proposals contain the leader, they are not necessarily centered
at it. Hence an enlargement proposal does not necessarily contain the community [−α, α] and a
reduction proposal is not necessarily included in it. The only proposals that are excluded are those
that try to attract peers of two consecutive communities without containing a leader, hence that
contain less than half of the peers of each one.
Stability against enlargement. Let αext be the value that maximizes PV , the payoff to an
extreme individual. Observe that αext is less than α0, thanks to assumptions A0 and A1 (the function
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log(PV ) is concave and is decreasing at α0 since P
′
P (α
0)+ V
′
V (α
0) ≤ P ′P (α0)+ U
′
α
U (0, α
0) = 0). Recall
that αenl is the unique solution to the equation α = infθ≤ααθ.
Proposition 5 A symmetric configuration with gaps is stable against enlargement if and only the
communities’ size is larger than αenl. A symmetric configuration without gaps is stable against
enlargement if the communities size is larger than αext, the maximizer of PV .
For a configuration with gaps, the same argument as for a single community applies (and the bound
follows from point 1 of Proposition 2). For a configuration without gaps, the stability requirement
is much weaker. Since communities are adjacent, outsiders, whatever close, achieve a positive payoff
at the standing configuration. Thus outsiders are more difficult to attract than in a configuration
with gaps, which explains why smaller sizes than the leader’s choice are compatible with stability.
Stability against reduction.
Proposition 6 A symmetric configuration is stable against reduction if the communities’ size is
smaller than some value αred, where αred ≥ α0. Under B−, one has αred > α0, and under B+,
αred = α0.
The distinction between configurations with or without gaps is not relevant as far as reduction is
concerned. As shown in the proof, stability against proposals that are smaller in size can be checked
by considering only proposals that are included in one of the community: such a proposal excludes
some of the members of an existing community and outsiders play no role.
Whereas stability to reduction requires communities not to be too large, stability to enlargement
requires them to be large enough. From the previous results, both stability conditions are compatible.
Corollary. A symmetric configuration with communities’ size equal to the leader’s choice is stable
both against enlargement and reduction.
A direct proof is straightforward since stability is checked against proposals that contain the
leader.
Let us consider now the stability against all possible proposals, including those which contain
no leader. One cannot rely on general results to prove the existence of a stable configuration (see
Demange 2005 for a survey). A first reason is that preferences are characterized by a parameter
on a circle (as opposed to an interval). The second reason is more fundamental, linked to adverse
selection: the payoffs to the members of a community may decrease with newcomers. Hence even in
a Hotelling or a vertical differentiation model, in which the parameter belongs to an interval, known
existence results cannot be applied. In our model, although we do not show the existence of a stable
configuration, we have no counterexample either. Let us examine the stability conditions against a
proposal that contains no leader. Such a proposal attracts peers from two adjacent communities at
most. Let it be centered at the adjacent point (it can be shown to be the one that has the more
chances to be successful) with size β. We have β ≤ α since the proposal contains no leader. The
proposal is successful if and only if
P (β)V (β) ≥ u¯(α− β).
This condition requires that an individual located at the extreme of the proposal, at distance β from
the center of the proposal, hence at a distance α− β from the center in the standing configuration,
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is willing to join. The condition is thus necessary. It is also sufficient since all individuals in the
proposal expect a larger utility than P (β)V (β) because they are closer to the center of the proposal,
and achieves a lower level in the standing configuration, because they are further away to the current
center. The inequality is surely not satisfied for β equal to 0 or α. When β runs between 0 and α,
the left hand side is hump-shaped and the right hand side increases, which makes it difficult to find
conditions on α ensuring that the inequality is not satisfied by any β.
We have so far considered symmetric configurations. Although an analysis of asymmetric con-
figurations is difficult, simple properties can be derived. For a configuration with gaps between each
two communities, the same conditions for stability as those stated in Propositions 5 and 6 apply
on the size of each community. For a configuration without gaps, the analysis is the same as far
as stability against reduction is concerned but is far more complex for the stability against enlarge-
ment. A difficulty is that stability does not require a peer at the adjacent point of two communities
to be indifferent between both. This is due to the impact of adverse selection and the resulting
non-monotony in the payoffs: let a peer at the adjacent point of two communities strictly prefer
one community, say C1 to the other C2; this is also true for some of his neighbors in C2 who would
like to join C1. But some peers in C1 may be hurt by them joining, in which case the enlarged
community does not block. As a result, we do not know much about the structure of an asymmetric
stable configuration.
4.3 Efficient configurations
Our objective here is to investigate efficiency. In particular we study efficient configurations and
their relationships with the stable ones. In a setup as here in which utility is not transferable, there
is not a unique welfare criterion to assess efficiency. In line with our framework, we restrict ourselves
to anonymous criteria. Such a criterion is characterized by a scalar function Φ that assigns a weight
Φ(v) to a utility level v. Φ can be any increasing and continuous function, and is normalized by
taking Φ(0) = 0. To simplify the presentation, individual cost c is taken to be nil (which implies
that the leader’s choice is unconstrained). The welfare reached by a community of size α is given by∫ α
−α
Φ[P (α)U(θ, α)]dθ. (6)
and the total welfare at a configuration is the sum of the welfare within each community. Consider
a symmetric configuration with viable community size α. Given the size, welfare is maximum at the
maximal number communities. We shall neglect integer problems and take that there are n = pi/α
communities. Normalizing by the total size 2pi for convenience, this gives the following expression
for the welfare reached at a symmetric configuration with community size α
WΦ(α) =
1
2α
∫ α
−α
Φ[P (α)U(θ, α)]dθ. (7)
In words, the normalized welfare is the average weighted utility per member. A concave function
Φ represents an aversion to inequality, and at the opposite a convex function favors dispersion
by putting increasingly larger weight on large utility levels.11 This can be made precise by the
following argument. Applying the intermediate value theorem to (7) gives that welfare is equal to
11Observe that a configuration that maximizes a concave welfare criterion is necessarily symmetric.
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Φ[P (α)U(θˆ(α), α)] for some θˆ(α), the welfare of a ’representative individual’. The more concave the
criterion is, the more distant from the center the representative individual is. Specifically, taking
a criterion Φ1 that is a concave transformation of Φ (i.e., Φ1 = G(Φ) for some G increasing and
concave) θˆ1(α) is larger than θˆ(α) (with obvious notation). At the limit, taking increasingly concave
criteria, the representative position approaches the extreme position, (θˆ(α) tends to α) leading to
the Rawlsian criterion, which puts weight on the minimum utility level only (a Rawlsian criterion is
not associated to a function Φ and is obtained only at the limit). Similarly, an ’elitist’ criterion that
only values the maximum utility level within a community, here the center’s utility level, is obtained
as a limit of increasingly convex functions. To sum up, a criterion that is ’very’ concave favors
individuals with the lowest utility levels in a community, that is individuals close to the extreme,
and at the opposite, a ’very’ convex criterion favors the individuals with the highest utility levels in
a community, those close to the center.
A Φ-optimal size is given by the value αΦ that maximizes WΦ. To understand the determinants
of an optimal size, observe that there are two effects as the size of each community increases: a
pure size effect within a community as if each peer could stay at the same distance to the center
whereas its community expands, and a position effect, due to the rearrangement of the communities
resulting from a reduction in their number. The position effect increases the distance to the center
on average, which is detrimental. The size effect may or may not be beneficial to peers depending
on their positions and the community’s size. An optimal size balances the two effects. These
position and size effects are summarized by considering the impact of the size on the ’representative’
individual’s utility, P (α)U(θˆ(α), α). An increase in α affects the utility of an individual located
at the fixed position θˆ(α) (size effect) and the representative individual’s position (change in θˆ(α))
which is detrimental because the position increases. Consider the binary case for example and
take α = α0. Taking Φ linear, Φ(v) = v, welfare is equal to 2piP (α)U(α/
√
2, α), that is the
’representative’ individual is located at α/
√
2. The size effect is surely beneficial (because B− is
satisfied which implies that all peers within the community benefit from an increase in the size) so
that the two effects are in opposite direction. The detrimental position effect can be shown to be
stronger than the size effect: αΦ is smaller than α0. This is more generally true under an additional
assumption A2 that evaluates the relative strength of the position and size effects and that we
introduce now.
Consider U(kα, α), the utility per signal associated to a fixed relative position k (between 0 and
1) in the community as the size α varies. U(kα, α) is decreasing in α since U is decreasing in both
arguments, the position and the size, and the relative loss is given by −[kUθ+Uα]U (kα, α). At k = 0 the
position effect is null, and the relative loss coincides with −UαU (0, α). At k = 1, the utility coincides
with V (α), and the relative loss is −V
′
V (α). Thus, the elasticity assumption A1 requires the relative
loss to be smaller for k = 0 than for k = 1. Assumption A2 strengthens this condition by requiring
the relative loss to be increasing in the relative position k. Writing kα = θ this is stated as follows.
AssumptionA2
−V ′
V
(α) ≥ −[Uα +
θ
αUθ]
U
(θ, α) ≥ −Uα
U
(0, α) for any θ ≤ α ≤ αmax.
A2 holds for the binary and quadratic functions.
Proposition 7 Under A2, for any criterion Φ strictly positive, increasing and continuous, the
optimal Φ-size of communities is larger than the optimal size for the Rawlsian criterion and smaller
than the optimal size for the elitist criterion: αext < αΦ < α0.
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Combining Propositions 6 and 7 yields the following corollary.
Corollary Under A2 and B−, a symmetric configuration without gaps and communities’ size
between α0 and αred is stable but is suboptimal for any criterion Φ.
Under B−, the preferred size of any peer is larger than the leader’s one (from Proposition 2). This is
why there are communities with a size larger than α0 that are stable. The configuration is however
surely not efficient: reducing each community entails some rearrangement in the communities, which
leads to a decrease on average in the distance to communities’ centers. These external effects are
not taken into account by peers as they evaluate their community. According to Proposition 7 the
overall impact on welfare of such a reduction would be positive whatever Φ.
When the size is larger than α0, negative external effects are large so that the configuration is
suboptimal whatever the criteria Φ.
It is difficult to predict which configurations will emerge without making explicit some ad-hoc
formation process. At the beginning of a process however communities have few chances to intersect,
and peers face a single opportunity at most so that communities should be of an optimal size when
considered in isolation. Thus, their size should be optimal, in particular larger than α0 if B− holds
(since peers unanimously prefer a size at least equal to α0). Hence an efficient configuration, which
requires the community’s size to be smaller than α0, can form only when proposals are made that
attract peers from two neighbored communities and result in a split. This suggests that efficiency
may be rather difficult to reach under B−.
5 Concluding remarks.
This paper considers a community as a cluster of individuals with similar preferences. Under
anonymity and limited language, the improvement in the value of information determines the scope
of a community. This has been analyzed in detail when recommendations are sufficiently rare so that
a peer uses the first one obtained, if any. With multiple signals, the value of a restricted community
is still positive when individuals truly differ in their tastes, as in a horizontal differentiation model.
In contrast, in a vertical differentiation model, in which individuals agree on ranking objects by a
quality characteristic and differ only by their minimum valuable quality level, the value of a commu-
nity may still be positive under a limited number of signals but vanishes as the number of available
recommendations per object increases. Hence, limited language and anonymity do not necessarily
imply that segregation into communities is valuable. Finally, I investigate the formation of several
communities under the assumption that an individual belongs to a single community at most and
show that stability and efficiency may enter into conflict.
The analysis could be extended in a variety of directions. A first direction is to analyze the
aggregation of recommendations within a community, in particular to see whether some aggregation
rules are more likely to be chosen, or some are more apt to ensure some sort of efficiency or stability.
Another line of investigation is to allow individuals to join multiple communities. This would require
to extend stability notions based on the threat of blocking to situations where coalitions overlap. A
third line is to incorporate pricing considerations into the analysis. Interesting questions then bear on
the fee structure, namely how (and whether) the recommendations given by peers are remunerated,
and how the access to these recommendations is charged. Of course the answer to these questions
should depend on the type of organization - say communities akin to co-operatives versus firms that
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serve as intermediaries between the providers and the users of information as in two-sided markets.
A very interesting issue then is how both types of organizations, communities and firms, interact.
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6 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let α ≤ d∗. From (2), we have U(θ, α) = p ∫ pi−pi fα(t)u(d(θ, t))dt
where fα is the density of objects conditional on the receipt of a yes from [−α, α] and p = P (yes ∈
[−α, α]) = d∗/pi. The prior density of t is f(t) = 1/(2pi). The density fα(t) and the conditional
probability of a positive signal given t, gα(t) = P (yes ∈ [−α, α]|t), are related by Bayes formula:
fα(t) = P (yes ∈ [−α, α]|t) f(t)
P (yes ∈ [−α, α]) =
1
2d∗
gα(t).
Given t, individuals with a type θ in [t− d∗, t+ d∗] say yes and others say no. Hence
gα(t) = P (yes ∈ [−α, α]|t) = 1
2α
∫ α
−α
1[t−d∗,t+d∗](θ)d(θ)
In community [−α, α], each member sends a signal yes for t ∈ [α − d∗,−α + d∗], which we call the
acquiescence zone, and each one sends no on [α + d∗,−α − d∗], which we call the refusal zone.
Outside these two zones there is disagreement. Since α ≤ d∗ ≤ pi/2, all zones are non-empty. By
symmetry gα(t) = gα(−t). Restricting to t ≥ 0 one has:
1 for t ∈ [0,−α+ d∗] acquiescence zone
gα(t) =
α+ d∗ − t
2α
for t ∈ [−α+ d∗, α+ d∗] disagreement zone
0 for t ∈ [α+ d∗, pi] refusal zone
which proves footnote 7.
To show the monotonicity of U , it is convenient to rewrite U . Let F (θ, α; .) denote the distribution
of the distance to θ of the objects that are recommended by community [−α, α]:
F (θ, α; δ) =
∫ pi
−pi
fα(t)1[θ−δ,θ+δ](t)dt. (8)
U can be written as
U(θ, α) = p
∫ pi
−pi
u(δ)dF (θ, α; δ) (9)
that is, U(θ, α) is the expectation of u(δ) -the utility for an object distant of δ- under the distribution
of the distance to θ of the objects that are recommended by community [−α, α] time the probability
of a positive recommendation. Function u is decreasing. Hence, U is decreasing with respect to θ or
to α (property (i) or (ii)) if the distributions of the distance δ are increasing by first order stochastic
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dominance as θ or α increases. Recall that these distributions increase with θ if for any δ, 0 ≤ δ ≤ pi,
any θ, θ′ with θ ≤ θ′
F (θ′, α; δ) ≤ F (θ, α; δ)
that is the function F (., α; δ) decreases with respect to θ. Similarly the distributions increase with
α if function F decreases with α.
(i) Let us show that F decreases with positive θ. From expression (8), F is differentiable with
respect to θ with a derivative equal to fα(θ+ δ)− fα(θ− δ). This term is always non-positive for θ
positive because the point θ − δ is closer to the center than θ + δ.
(ii) Let us show that F decreases with respect to α. F is differentiable since function fα(t) is
differentiable almost everywhere with respect to α. Note that fα has a null derivative except on
the disagreement zones. Hence taking the derivative under the integral (8), one has ∂F/∂α = I + J
where
I =
∫ α+d∗
−α+d∗
fαα (t)1[θ−δ,θ+δ](t)dt where f
α
α (t) = −
d∗ − t
8d∗α2
.
and J is defined similarly over the negative disagreement zone. We show I ≤ 0. Note that fαα is
antisymmetric around d∗. Making a change of variable, I writes
I =
∫ α+d∗
d∗
fαα (t)
[
1[θ−δ,θ+δ](t)− 1[θ−δ,θ+δ](2d∗ − t)
]
dt
Since fαα is positive on [d
∗, α + d∗] it suffices to show that the term in brackets is non-positive, or
that when t ∈ [d∗, α + d∗] ∩ [θ − δ, θ + δ] then 2d∗ − t ∈ [θ − δ, θ + δ]. Geometrically, this is true
because the middle of [θ− δ, θ+ δ], θ, is by assumption less than d∗, the middle of [−α+d∗, α+ d∗].
More formally observe that t ∈ [d∗, α + d∗] ∩ [θ − δ, θ + δ] implies d∗ ≤ t ≤ θ + δ, which gives
2d∗ − (θ + δ) ≤ 2d∗ − t ≤ d∗ ≤ θ + δ. Now since θ is by assumption less than d∗, we also have
θ − δ ≤ 2d∗ − (θ + δ), and finally 2d∗ − t ∈ [θ − δ, θ + δ], the desired result. Hence I is surely
non-positive. The same argument applies to show J ≤ 0, which proves ∂F/∂α ≤ 0.
(iii) V (α) = U(α, α) is decreasing in α because, from the previous steps, U decreases in both
arguments. Since V is positive for α equal to 0 and negative for α larger than d∗, there is a threshold
αmax below (resp.above) which V is positive (resp. negative).
(iv) The person who could draw the largest benefits from a strategy of buying upon a negative
signal is located at the opposite of the leader, at pi. With such a strategy, the objects that are
bought are in the refusal zone or in the disagreement zone (with some probability). The refusal zone
[α+ d∗,−α− d∗] is an arc centered at pi with size δ = pi − α− d∗. The expected utility for the peer
from buying all the objects is negative when this size is larger than 2d∗. Since pi−α− d∗ ≥ pi− 2d∗,
this is true for pi/4 ≥ d∗. Also all the objects in the disagreement zone are distant from pi by more
than d∗. Observe that this argument holds more generally when peers search for more than one
recommendation or when they receive a statistic of recommendations.
Proof of proposition 2.
Point 1 is proved in the text.
Point 2. The optimal choice of the leader is the value of α that maximizes P (α)U(0, α) under the
viability constraint P (α)V (α) ≥ c. Viability implies that α is smaller than αmax, the value for which
U(α, α) = V (α) is null. For such sizes, U and V are positive. The objective and the constraint are
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log-concave so that the first order condition is sufficient (alternatively we could work with logPU
and logPV ). Let µ be the multiplier associated with the constraint. The first order condition is
PαU(0, α) + PUα(0, α) + µ[PαV + PV ′](α) = 0. (10)
If µ is null, the optimal choice is α0 that maximizes PU(0, α), the leader’s optimum. If µ is positive,
the constraint binds: α0 is not viable, i.e. outside the interval [α, α]. Furthermore the solution
solves P (α)V (α) = c, hence is either α or α. Note that PV increases at α and decreases at α. From
(10), the derivatives of PU and PV are of opposite sign. If the latter derivative is positive, PV
increases: the solution is α. Since under A1, PαV + PV ′ > 0 implies PαU(0, α) + PUα(0, α) ≥ 0,
it must be that the derivative of PV is non-positive: the solution is α. Furthermore we surely have
PαU(0, α) + PUα(0, α) > 0 at α = α.
Let us consider now θ-peers in the community with 0 < θ. Under A0, the function logPU
is concave with respect to α, with a derivative given by [PαP (α) +
Uα
U (θ, α)]. From A1 [
Pα
P (α) +
Uα
U (0, α)] ≥ 0 implies [PαP (α) + UαU (θ, α)] > 0. Thus, if the leader’s choice is unconstrained, equal to
α0, the first term is null at α0, which implies that logP (α0)U(θ, α0) increases for 0 < θ: peers not
at the center prefer a larger size. If the leader’s choice is constrained, we have seen that the first
term is strictly positive at the leader’s choice α, hence all peers would prefer a larger size.
Finally observe that when the cost is null, the leader is unconstrained: since the α0-peer prefers
a larger size than the leader, we surely have U(α0, α0) > 0.
Point 3 is straightforward.
Proof of proposition 3. The optimal choice of the leader is the value that maximizes P (λ, α)U(0, α)−
c(λ) over (λ, α) subject to P (λ, α)V (α)− c(λ) ≥ 0. Let µ be the multiplier associated with the con-
straint. The first order conditions are
PαU(0, α) + PUα(0, α) + µ[PαV + PV ′](α) = 0 (11)
PλU(0, α)− c′(λ) + µ[PλV (α)− c′(λ)] = 0 (12)
When µ is null, the viability constraint does not bind, and the leader can choose its optimal value.
The same argument as in proposition 2 yields that for the chosen value of λ other peers would
like the size to increase. As for the contribution rate, (12) yields PλU(0, α) − c′(λ) = 0, hence
PλU(θ, α)− c′(λ) ≤ 0 since U(θ, α) ≤ U(0, α): a θ-peer would prefer a smaller contribution rate.
When µ is positive, we know that (11) and A1 implies that α is set at the maximal viable size
associated to the chosen λ, α(λ). From the first order condition on λ (12), PλU(0, α) − c′(λ) and
PλV (α)− c′(λ) are of opposite sign. Since U(0, α) > V (α) it must be that the former is positive and
the latter is negative: the leader would prefer to increase the contribution rate but the individual at
the extreme would lose from this increase and quit the community since he just breaks even. Hence
the trade-off because α(λ) decreases.
Proof of proposition 4 Point 1. As n increases, the statistics s˜n (knowing n) are getting more
informative in the sense of Blackwell. To see this, given a value sn create a n-vector of 0 and 1 by
assigning at random sn values 1 and n − sn values 0. Taking the n − 1 first components yields a
n− 1-vector that is distributed according to n− 1 signals, which is informationally equivalent to the
statistic sn−1. Thus the sequence U(θ, C, n) increases in n. The sequence U(θ, C, n) is increasing in
n. It converges to U(θ, C,∞) since by the law of large numbers, the proportion of positive signals,
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s˜n/n, converges to gC(t) when n tends to ∞. This gives that U(θ, C,∞) is an upper bound to
U(θ, C, n) (which can be also derived by the fact that the statistics s˜n is less informative than gC(t)
since it is the result of a sample drawn from that distribution).
Point 2 has been proved in the text, as well as point 3 for vertical differentiation. Let us consider
now the circle model. Because of weak risk aversion, two individuals distant of more than 2d∗ cannot
benefit both from the community whatever the number of signals. Let the community be centered
at 0 of size larger than d∗ and choose θ with d∗ < θ < α. We have that u(|t + θ|) + u(|t − θ|) < 0
whatever t since the sum of the distance |t + θ| and |t − α|) is the maximum of 2θ and 2t, hence
larger than 2d∗. This implies that U(θ, C, n) +U(−θ, C, n) < 0 and by symmetry U(θ, C, n) < 0 for
all n. Hence individuals at or close to the extreme point behave as if they had no information and
never buy. Whatever value for the cost c, they strictly prefer not to join the community.
I prove now that the optimal strategy for a θ-peer on the receipt of gC(t) is characterized by the
threshold tˆ defined by the equation u(|θ+t|)+u(|θ−t|) = 0, The value of gC(t) gives that the object
is either at t or −t with equal probaility. Hence it is optimal to buy if u(|θ + t|) + u(|θ − t|) > 0
(and not to buy if the expression is < 0). The function is positive at t = 0 because the community
size is smaller than d∗, is negative at t = d∗ for θ 6= 0 because of risk aversion, and is decreasing in
t: this proves the claim. For θ = 0, or under risk neutrality the threshold value is d∗.
Proof of Proposition 5. Enlarging a community that touches no other community is accepted
if all peers and newcomers are better off. This is equivalent to say that the single community is not
Pareto-optimal as considered in point 1 of Proposition 2, hence the result.
Consider now a configuration without gaps with community size α larger than αext. At the
standing configuration, the minimum utility level is achieved by an individual located at an extreme
point of a community, hence u¯(θ) ≥ (PV )(α) for each θ. Given a proposal to an enlargement of size
β larger than α, let us consider an individual located at an extreme point of the proposal. If the
proposal is accepted, his expected payoff is (PV )(β). This is strictly smaller than (PV )(α) since PV
decreases for size larger than αext: the peer would be strictly worse off by accepting. By continuity,
this is also true for individuals close to the extreme of the new community: the proposal is rejected.
Proof of Proposition 6 The proof is divided into two steps.
Step 1. This step shows that stability can be checked by considering proposals that are centered
at the leader’s position. For that, consider [−m−β,−m+β], a reduction proposal centered at −m,
0 < m. We have m < β < α because the leader belongs to the proposal. We show that if this
proposal is accepted, then the centered proposal [−β, β] is also accepted.
Formally, since up to a rotation U(θ, [−m− β,−m+ β]) = U(θ+m, [−β, β]) = U(θ+m,β), the
proposal [−m− β,−m+ β] is accepted if
P (β)U(θ +m,β)− c > u¯(θ) for each θ +m ∈ [−β, β] (13)
We have to show these inequalities imply
P (β)U(θ, β)− c > u¯(θ) for each θ ∈ [−β, β]. (14)
By symmetry of U and u, it is sufficient to show that inequality (14) is met for positive θ. We
consider separately θ in [0,m] and θ in [m,β].
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Let θ in [0,m]. The monotony of U (Proposition 1) and u implies the inequalities U(θ, β) >
U(m,β) and u¯(0) ≥ u¯(θ). Since taking θ = 0 in (??) gives P (β)U(m,β)− c > u¯(0), we obtain that
(14) holds for any θ with 0 ≤ θ ≤ m.
Let θ in [m,β]. Define θ′ = θ − m. Note that both θ and θ′ belong to [0, α] in the standing
configuration and θ′ is closer to the center than θ. Therefore u¯(θ′) > u¯(θ). Since θ′ + m = θ is
in [0, β], (13) applied to θ′ gives P (β)U(θ, β) − c > u¯(θ′) > u¯(θ), that is (14) holds for any θ with
0 ≤ θ ≤ m.
Step 2. From Step 1, stability against reduction is checked by considering proposals centered at
0, [−β, β], β < α. For such proposals we have u¯(θ) = P (α)U(θ, α) − c for each θ ∈ [−β, β]. Hence
proposal [−β, β] is accepted if
P (β)U(θ, β) > P (α)U(θ, α), θ ∈]− β, β[. (15)
We shall distinguish between the two cases where B+ or B− holds.
Case 1 Assume B+. Consider a community of size larger than α0. A proposal of size α0 is
accepted. Conversely given a community of size less or equal than α0, any proposal with a smaller
size makes individuals close to the center worse off, hence is not accepted. Thus internal stability is
satisfied for α ≤ α0.
Case 2 Assume B−. Any size strictly below the leader’s choice is internally stable: whether this
choice is constrained or not, any peer prefers to increase the size.
By continuity, inequalities (15) imply P (β)U(β, β) ≥ P (α)U(β, α). Thus a sufficient condition
for stability against reduction is
P (α)U(β, α) > P (β)U(β, β) for each 0 < β < α. (16)
We show that, conversely conditions (16) are necessary for stability against reduction. By con-
tradiction, let inequality P (β∗)U(β∗, β∗) ≥ P (α)U(β∗, α) be met for some β∗ smaller than α.
Proposal [−β∗, β∗] makes β∗- or −β∗-individuals at least as well off. Conditions B− then im-
ply that all members in ] − β∗, β∗[ are strictly better off. To see this, observe that the ratio
U(θ,α)
U(θ′,α) decreases with α for θ < θ
′ (because the derivative with respect to α of the log of the ratio
is Uα(θ,α)U(θ,α) − Uα(θ
′,α)
U(θ′,α) , which is negative under B− ). Taking θ
′ = β∗, this gives
U(θ, α)
U(β∗, α)
≤ U(θ, β
∗)
U(β∗, β∗)
for θ < β∗ < α.
Using the assumption P (α)U(β∗, α) ≤ P (β∗)U(β∗, β∗), this gives
P (α)U(θ, α) < P (α)U(θ, β∗)
U(β∗, α)
U(β∗, β∗)
≤ P (β∗)U(θ, β∗) for each θ < β∗
Thus, by symmetry, (15) is satisfied at β = β∗: proposal [−β∗, β∗] is accepted.
Denote by A the set of sizes that satisfy inequalities (16). As just shown, the sizes that are
viable and belong to A describe configurations that are stable against reduction. A is non-empty
since it contains ]0, α0] (any peer prefers to increase the size). We show that A is an interval of
the form ]0, αred[. If (16) is satisfied for all viable sizes, A =]0, α] and take αred = α. Otherwise,
consider the smallest value, αred for which (16) does not hold. We have P (α)U(β, α) > P (β)U(β, β)
for each α < αred and β < α. Furthermore, since (16) does not hold at αred, there is some α∗ <
30
αred with P (αred)U(α∗, αred) ≤ P (α∗)U(α∗, α∗). Therefore, by continuity, P (αred)U(α∗, αred) =
P (α∗)U(α∗, α∗) and the function α → P (α)U(α∗, α) decreases at α = αred. By logconcavity, it
decreases for larger values than αred, hence
P (α)U(α∗, α) ≤ P (αred)U(α∗, αred) = P (α∗)U(α∗, α∗).
Inequality (16) does not hold for a size larger than αred: the set A is the interval ]0, αred[.
Proof of Proposition 7. Welfare WΦ (7) writes:
WΦ(α) =
1
α
∫ α
0
Φ[P (α)U(θ, α)]dθ. (17)
Take the derivative with respect to α:
W ′Φ(α) =
1
α
{∫ α
0
Φ′[P (α)U(θ, α)][PUα + PαU ](θ, α)dθ +Φ[P (α)U(α, α)]
− 1
α
∫ α
0
Φ[P (α)U(θ, α)]dθ
}
(18)
Integration by parts of θ → θΦ[P (α)U(θ, α)] over the interval [0, α] gives
αΦ[P (α)U(α, α)]−
∫ α
0
Φ[P (α)U(θ, α)]dθ =
∫ α
0
θΦ′[P (α)U(θ, α)]P (α)Uθ(θ, α)dθ.
Hence
W ′Φ(α) =
1
α
∫ α
0
Φ′[P (α)U(θ, α)][PUα + P ′U +
θ
α
PUθ](θ, α)]dθ. (19)
The term [PUα + PαU ] represents the size effect, and the term [ θαPUθ], which is always negative,
reflects the position effect. We may restrict to viable sizes on which PU(θ, α) is positive. Hence,
writing
[
PUα + P ′U + θαPUθ
]
= (PU)
[
P ′
P +
Uα+
θ
αUθ
U
]
, Assumption A2 yields[
PUα + P ′U +
θ
α
PUθ
]
(θ, α) ≤ (PU)(θ, α)
[
P ′
P
(α) +
Uα
U
(0, α)
]
.
Consider the right hand side. For a size α larger than α0, the term inside the square brackets is
non-positive. Since PU is positive, the left hand side is non-positive as well. Using the expression
(22) and the positivity of Φ′, this implies the inequality W ′Φ(α) < 0 for α ≥ α0 : surely αΦ < α0.
A similar argument yields αΦ > αext where αext is the maximum of PV (α), the payoff to an
extreme individual. For α ≤ αext, we have P ′P (α) + V
′
V (α) ≥ 0 (by concavity of log(PV )). Under
A2
[PUα + P ′U +
θ
α
PUθ](θ, α) ≥ (PU)(θ, α)
[
P ′(α)
P (α)
+
V ′
V
]
≥ 0.
This implies W ′Φ(α) > 0 for α ≤ αext, which gives αext < αΦ.
Appendix
Binary function. Given a binary function, set k = (b+g)4gd∗ . As computed below the utility levels
for peers inside a community of size α ≤ d∗ are given by
U(θ, α) = pg[1− kα(1 + θ
2
α2
)] for θ ∈ [−α, α] (20)
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and for those outside the community at a distance less than d∗
U(θ, α) = pg[1− 2kθ] for α < |θ| ≤ d∗. (21)
Let us check that assumptions A0, B−, and A2 (which implies A1) are satisfied. Equation (20) gives
V (α) = pg(1− 2kα) and αmax = 1/2k. Hence A0 is met since U and V are concave in α.
B−. We have
−Uα
U
(θ, α) = k(1− θ
2
α2
)/[1− k(α+ θ
2
α
)].
Hence the function is decreasing in θ2 if kα <
1
α2 [1 − kα] or equivalently if 1 − 2kα > 0, that is
α ≤ αmax = 1/2k. Consider now A2. One has:
U(θ, α) = U(0, α)− pgk θ
2
α
, Uα(θ, α) = Uα(0, α) + pgk
θ2
α2
, Uθ(θ, α) = −2pgk θ
α
.
This gives −[Uα + θα0Uθ] = −Uα(0, α) + pgk θ
2
α2 , which is increasing and positive with θ in [0, α].
Since U decreases, A2 is met.
Computation of (20). We shall use repeatedly that for t1, t2 in the (positive) disagreement zone one
has ∫ t2
t1
fα(t)dt =
−1
8d∗α
(α+ d∗ − t)2|t2t1 =
1
8d∗α
(t2 − t1)(2α+ 2d∗ − (t2 + t1)) (22)
Let us compute the utility derived from buying conditional on a yes, for a θ-individual in the
community, i.e., U divided by p. For objects t ≥ 0, he achieves:
in the acquiescence zone [0,−α+ d∗]: g,
in the disagreement zone [−α + d∗, α + d∗]: g for any object in [−α + d∗, θ + d∗], and −b on
[θ + d∗, α+ d∗]. No object in the refusal zone receives a yes. This gives using (22)
g
d∗ − α
2d∗
+
1
8d∗α
[g(α+ θ)(3α− θ)− b(α− θ)2].
By symmetry, the utility for a θ-individual on negative t is equal to that of a (-θ)-individual on
positive t. Thus the utility for t-objects with t ≤ 0 is equal to:
g
d∗ − α
2d∗
+
1
8d∗α
[g(α− θ)(3α+ θ)− b(α+ θ)2]
Collecting terms gives that the overall utility of a θ-peer receiving a yes is equal to:
g(
d∗ − α
d∗
) +
1
4d∗α
[g(3α2 − θ2)− b(α2 + θ2)]
Rearranging and multiplying by p gives (20).
Consider now an individual outside the community whose distance to the center is less than d∗
and let us prove (21). We compute the utility derived on objects with positive t for θ-individual and
distinguish positive and negative θ.
A θ-individual with α < θ < d∗, gets the benefit g for all positive objects that he buys: the
individual likes all t-objects with 0 ≤ t ≤ θ+d∗ and a t-object can be recommended only if t < α+d∗
which is smaller than θ + d∗. Thus he achieves g/2 (1/2 is the probability of an object being in the
positive zone knowing that it is recommended). An individual located at −θ, α < θ < d∗, achieves
in the acquiescence zone g for objects with 0 ≤ t ≤ −θ+d∗ and −b for −θ+d∗ ≤ t ≤ −α+d∗. In the
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disagreement zone he dislikes all objects hence achieves −b. This gives a total of g d∗−θ2d∗ −b θ−α2d∗ −b α2d∗ ,
or g/2 − (b + g) θ2d∗ = g(1/2 − 2kθ). Using the symmetry property again, collecting terms and
multiplying by p gives (21). The utility is positive for θ ≤ d∗(2g/(b+ g)) ≤ d∗, the last inequality
because g ≤ b.
Quadratic function. Let u(d) = d∗2 − d2. We first show that U(θ, α) = d∗pi [d
∗2
3 − 23α2 − θ2].
Note that d(t, θ) = |t− θ| for all t when this expression is smaller than pi. This is surely the case
for t not in the refusal zone, that is |t| ≤ α+ d∗ and θ ∈ [−α, α] (for such t we have |t− θ| ≤ 2α+ d∗
and it suffices to use α ≤ d∗ and the assumption d∗ < pi/4 to obtain 2α+ d∗ < pi ). Hence, since fα
is null in the refusal zone, the value of U writes U(θ, α) = d
∗
pi [
∫ pi
−pi(d
∗2 − (θ − t)2)fα(t)dt.
This implies that U(0, α) − U(θ, α) is independent of α. To see this write U(0, α) − U(θ, α) =
d∗
pi
∫ pi
−pi[(θ−t)2−t2]fα(t)dt, and developing (θ−t)2−t2 = θ2−2θt, the integral of the term associated
to the product θt is null by symmetry of fα. Using
∫ pi
−pi f
α(t) = 1 gives U(0, α)− U(θ, α) = d∗pi θ2.
Thus Uα(θ, α) is independent of θ. Hence the ratio [−Uα/U ](θ, α) increases with θ because −Uα
is positive and U decreases with θ: B+ is satisfied.
It remains to compute U(0, α) = d
∗
pi [
∫ pi
−pi(d
∗2 − t2)fα(t)dt] = d∗pi [d∗2 −
∫ pi
−pi t
2fα(t)dt]. Simple but
tedious computation gives successively∫ pi
−pi
t2fα(t)dt =
1
d∗
(
∫ d∗−α
0
t2dt+
∫ d∗+α
d∗−α
t2
α+ d∗ − t
2α
dt)
=
1
12αd∗
[(d∗ + α)4 − (d∗ − α)4] = 2
3
[d∗2 + α2]
Hence U(0, α) = d
∗
pi [
d∗2
3 − 13α2] and U(α, α) = d
∗
pi [
d∗2
3 − 53α2]. Thus U is concave in both α and θ.
A0, B+ are satisfied hence also A1 and one checks that A2 is satisfied. The value αmax that satisfies
U(α, α) = 0 is equal to d∗/
√
5.
Coordination failure example. Given proposals [−α, β] and [−β, α], let C1 be the individuals
whose characteristics belong to (−α,−β) ∪ (0, β), and C2 to (−β, 0) ∪ (β, α). We claim that for
β = 2α/3 the two communities C1 and C2 form an equilibrium. The expected utility levels derived
from choosing C1 and C2 under the expectations that they form are given respectively by (see
footnote 10)
P (α2 )[
(α−β)
α U(θ, [−α,−β]) + βαU(θ, [0, β])] and P (α2 )[ (α−β)α U(θ, [β, α]) + βαU(θ, [−β, 0])].
We shall use the following property. From the expressions (20) and (21) the utility derived from
an arc is concave with respect to the distance (|θ|) to the center for the peers inside the arc and it is
linear in that distance for the peers outside. Overall the function is concave since it is differentiable
at the boundary point when θ = α.
We first show that peers at the boundaries, −β, 0, and β are indifferent between C1 and C2.
Given the symmetry, it is obvious for 0 and it suffices to show it for −β for instance. Observe
that −β is outside or at the extreme of any of the arcs considered. Hence the utility from either
community is derived by computing the weighted distance of −β to the center of each arc in the
community. One checks that for β = 2α/3, the weighted distance to the arcs in C2 is 23
β
2 +
1
3 (
α+3β
2 ),
and that to C1 is 23
3β
2 +
1
3 (
α−β
2 ) which are both equal to
α+5β
6 : the −β-peer is indifferent between
the two communities.
It remains to show that the peers in the interior of (−β, 0) or (β, α) prefer C2 to C1. As a
function of θ in (−β, 0), the utility for C2 is concave and the utility for C1 is linear (since such a θ is
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outside the intervals forming C1). Hence the difference in the utility levels is a concave function of θ
in (−β, 0) and is null at the extreme −β and 0: all peers in (−β, 0) prefer C2 to C1. The same result
holds for θ in the arc (β, α) since a β-peer is indifferent between C2 to C1 and an α-peer clearly
prefers C2 to C1.
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